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Internal credit ratings are becoming increasingly im-
portant in credit risk management at large U.S. banks.
Banks’ internal ratings are somewhat like ratings
produced by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and other
public rating agencies in that they summarize the risk
of loss due to failure by a given borrower to pay as
promised.1 However, banks’ rating systems differ
signiﬁcantly from those of the agencies (and from
each other) in architecture and operating design as
well as in the uses to which ratings are put. One
reason for these differences is that banks’ ratings are
assigned by bank personnel and are usually not
revealed to outsiders.2
For large banks, whose commercial borrowers may
number in the tens of thousands, internal ratings are
an essential ingredient in effective credit risk manage-
ment.3 Without the distillation of information that
ratings represent, any comparison of the risk posed
by such a large number of borrowers would be
extremely difﬁcult because of the need to simulta-
neously consider many risk factors for each of the
many borrowers. Most large banks use ratings in one
or more key areas of risk management that involve
credit, such as guiding the loan origination process,
portfolio monitoring and management reporting,
analysis of the adequacy of loan loss reserves or
capital, proﬁtability and loan pricing analysis, and as
inputs to formal portfolio risk management models.
Banks typically produce ratings only for business and
institutional loans and counterparties, not for con-
sumer loans or other assets.
In short, risk ratings are the primary summary
indicator of risk for banks’ individual credit expo-
sures. They both shape and reﬂect the nature of credit
decisions that banks make daily. Understanding how
rating systems are conceptualized, designed, oper-
ated, and used in risk management is thus essential to
understanding how banks perform their business
lending function and how they choose to control risk
exposures.4
The speciﬁcs of internal rating system architecture
and operation differ substantially across banks. The
number of grades and the risk associated with
each grade vary across institutions, as do decisions
about who assigns ratings and about the manner in
which rating assignments are reviewed. In general,
in designing rating systems, bank management must
weigh numerous considerations, including cost, efﬁ-
ciency of information gathering, consistency of rat-
ings produced, staff incentives, the nature of the
bank’s business, and the uses to be made of internal
ratings.
A central theme of this article is that, to a consider-
able extent, variations across banks are an example of
form following function. There does not appear to be
one ‘‘correct’’ rating system. Instead, ‘‘correctness’’
depends on how the system is used. For example, a
bank that uses ratings mainly to identify deteriorating
or problem loans to ensure proper monitoring may
ﬁnd that a rating scale with relatively few grades is
adequate. In contrast, if ratings are used in computing
1. For example, bonds rated Aaa on Moody’s scale or AAA on
Standard & Poor’s scale pose negligible risk of loss in the short to
medium term, whereas those rated Caa or CCC are quite risky.
2. For additional information about the internal rating systems of
large and smaller banks, see Thomas F. Brady, William B. English,
and William R. Nelson, ‘‘Recent Changes to the Federal Reserve’s
Survey of Terms of Business Lending,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin,
vol. 84 (August 1998), pp. 604–15; see also William B. English and
William R. Nelson, ‘‘Bank Risk Rating of Business Loans’’ (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 1998).
For information about the rating systems of large banks and about
credit risk management practices in general, see Robert Morris Asso-
ciates and First Manhattan Consulting Group, Winning the Credit
Cycle Game: A Roadmap for Adding Shareholding Value Through
Credit Portfolio Management (1997).
For a survey of the academic literature on ratings and credit risk,
see Edward I. Altman and Anthony Saunders, ‘‘Credit Risk Measure-
ment: Developments over the Last 20 Years,’’ Journal of Banking and
Finance, vol. 21 (December 1997), pp. 1721–42.
3. See the Federal Reserve’s Supervision and Regulation Letter
SR 98-25, ‘‘Sound Credit Risk Management and the Use of Internal
Credit Risk Ratings at Large Banking Organizations’’ (September 21,
1998), which stresses the importance of risk rating systems for
large banks and describes elements of such systems that are ‘‘nec-
essary to support sophisticated credit risk management’’ (p. 1).
SR Letters are available on the Federal Reserve Board’s web site,
http://www.federalreserve.gov.
4. Credit risk can arise from a loan already extended, loan commit-
ments that have not yet been drawn, letters of credit, or obligations
under other contracts such as ﬁnancial derivatives. This article follows
industry usage by referring to individual loans or commitments as
‘‘facilities’’ and overall credit risk arising from such transactions as
‘‘exposure.’’internal proﬁtability measures, a scale with a rela-
tively large number of grades may be required to
achieve ﬁne distinctions of credit risk.
As with the decision to extend credit, the rating
process almost always involves the exercise of human
judgment because the factors considered in assigning
a rating and the weight given each factor can differ
signiﬁcantly across borrowers. Given the substantial
role of judgment, banks must pay careful attention
to the internal incentives they create and to internal
rating review and control systems to avoid introduc-
ing bias. The direction of such bias tends to be related
to the functions that ratings are asked to perform in
the bank’s risk management process. For example, at
banks that use ratings in computing proﬁtability mea-
sures, establishing pricing guidelines, or setting loan
size limits, the staff may be tempted to assign ratings
that are more favorable than warranted.
Many banks use statistical models as an element of
the rating process, but banks generally believe that
the limitations of statistical models are such that
properly managed judgmental rating systems deliver
more accurate estimates of risk. Especially for large
exposures, the beneﬁts of such accuracy may out-
weigh the higher costs of judgmental systems. In
contrast, statistical credit scores are often the primary
basis for credit decisions for small lending exposures,
such as consumer credit.
Although form generally follows function in the
systems used to rate business loans, our impression is
that in some cases the two are not closely aligned.
For example, because of the rapid pace of change in
the risk management practices of large banks, their
rating systems are increasingly being used for pur-
poses for which they were not originally designed.
When a bank applies ratings in a new way, such as in
risk-sensitive analysis of business line proﬁtability,
the existing ratings and rating system are often used
as-is. It may become clear only over time that the
new function has imposed new stresses on the rating
system and that changes in the system are needed.
Several conditions appear to magnify such stresses
on bank rating systems. The conceptual meaning of
ratings may be somewhat unclear, rating criteria may
be largely or wholly maintained as a matter of culture
rather than formal written policy, and corporate data-
bases may not support analysis of the relationship
between grade assignments and historical loss experi-
ence. Such circumstances make ratings more difﬁcult
to review and audit and also require loan review units
in effect to deﬁne, maintain, and ﬁne-tune rating
standards in a dynamic fashion.
This article describes internal rating systems
at large U.S. banks, focusing on the relationship
between form and function, the stresses that are evi-
dent, and the current conceptual and practical barriers
to achieving accurate, consistent ratings. We hope to
promote understanding of this critical element of risk
management—among the industry, supervisors, aca-
demics, and other interested parties—and thereby
promote further enhancements to risk management.
This article is based on information from internal
reports and credit policy documents for the ﬁfty
largest U.S. bank holding companies, from interviews
with senior bankers and others at more than ﬁfteen
major holding companies and other relevant institu-
tions, and from conversations with Federal Reserve
bank examiners. The institutions we interviewed
cover the spectrum of size and practice among the
ﬁfty largest banks, but a disproportionate share of the
banks we interviewed have relatively advanced inter-
nal rating systems.5
THE ARCHITECTURE OF BANK INTERNAL
RATING SYSTEMS
In choosing the architecture of its rating system, a
bank must decide which loss concepts to employ, the
number and meaning of grades on the rating scale
corresponding to each loss concept, and whether
to include ‘‘watch’’ and ‘‘regulatory’’ grades on such
scales. The choices made and the reasons for them
vary widely, but on the whole, the primary determi-
nants of bank rating system architecture appear to be
the bank’s mix of large and smaller borrowers and
the extent to which the bank uses quantitative sys-
tems for credit risk management and proﬁtability
analysis. In principle, banks must also decide whether
to grade borrowers according to their current con-
dition or their expected condition under stress.
Although the rating agencies employ the latter,
‘‘through the cycle,’’ philosophy, almost all banks
have chosen to grade to current condition (see
the box ‘‘Point-in-Time vs. Through-the-Cycle
Grading’’).
Loss Concepts and Their Implementation
The credit risk of a loan or other exposure over a
given period involves both the probability of default
(PD) and the fraction of the loan’s value that is likely
to be lost in the event of default (LIED). LIED is
always speciﬁc to a given facility because it depends
5. Internal rating systems are typically used throughout U.S. bank-
ing organizations. For brevity, we use the term ‘‘bank’’ to refer to
consolidated banking organizations, not just the chartered bank.
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ally associated with the borrower, the presumption
being that a borrower will default on all obligations if
it defaults on any.6 The product of PD and LIED is
the expected loss (EL) on the exposure in a statistical
sense. It represents an estimate of the average per-
centage loss rate over time on a group of loans all
having the given expected loss. A positive expected
loss is not, however, a forecast that losses will in fact
occur on any individual loan.
The banks at which we conducted interviews fall
into two categories with regard to loss concept. About
60 percent have one-dimensional rating systems,
in which ratings are assigned to facilities. In such
systems, ratings approximate EL. The remaining
40 percent have two-dimensional systems, in which
the borrower’s general creditworthiness (approxi-
mately PD) is appraised on one scale while the risk
posed by individual exposures (approximately EL) is
appraised on another; invariably the two scales have
the same number of rating categories.7
A number of banks would no doubt dispute our
characterization of their single-scale systems as mea-
suring EL; in interviews, several maintained that
their ratings primarily reﬂect the borrower’s PD.
However, collateral and loan structure play a role in
grading at such banks both in practical terms and in
the deﬁnitions of grades. Moreover, certain specialty
loans—such as cash-collateralized loans, those eli-
gible for government guarantees, and asset-based
loans—can receive relatively low risk grades, a dis-
tinction reﬂecting the fact that the EL for such loans
6. Admittedly, PD might differ across transactions with the same
borrower. For example, a borrower may attempt to force a favorable
restructuring of its term loan by halting payment on the loan while
continuing to honor the terms of a foreign exchange swap with the
same bank. However, for practical purposes, estimating a single
probability of any default by a borrower is usually sufﬁcient.
7. The policy documents of banks we did not interview indicate
that they also have one- or two-dimensional rating systems, and our
impression is that the discussion of loss concepts above applies
equally well to these banks.
Point-in-Time vs. Through-the-Cycle Grading
A common way of implementing a long-horizon, through-
the-cycle rating philosophy involves estimating the borrow-
er’s condition at the worst point in an economic or industry
cycle and grading according to the risk posed at that point.
Although ‘‘downside’’ or ‘‘borrower stress’’ scenarios are
an element of many banks’ underwriting decisions, every
bank we interviewed bases risk ratings on the borrower’s
current condition. Rating the current condition is consistent
with the fact that rating criteria at banks do not seem to be
updated to take account of the current phase of the business
cycle. Banks we interviewed do vary somewhat in the time
period they have in mind when producing ratings, with
about 25 percent rating the borrower’s risk over a one-year
period, 25 percent rating over a longer period such as the
life of the loan, and the remaining 50 percent having no
speciﬁc period in mind. How closely raters adhere to time
horizon guidelines at banks that have them is not clear.
In contrast to bank practice, both Moody’s and S&P rate
through the cycle. They analyze the borrower’s current
condition at least partly to obtain an anchor point for
determining the severity of the downside scenario. The
borrower’s projected condition in the event the downside
scenario occurs is the primary determinant of the rating.
Only borrowers that are very weak at the time of the
analysis are rated primarily according to current condition.
Under this philosophy, the migration of borrowers’ ratings
up and down the scale as the overall economic cycle
progresses will be muted: Ratings will change mainly for
those ﬁrms that experience good or bad shocks that affect
long-term condition or ﬁnancial strategy and for those
whose original downside scenario was too optimistic. The
agencies’ through-the-cycle philosophy probably accounts
for their considerable emphasis on a borrower’s industry
and its position within the industry. For many ﬁrms, indus-
try supply and demand cycles are as important or more
important than the overall business cycle in determining
cash ﬂow.
In interviews, we did not discuss the reasons that banks
rate to current condition, but two possibilities are the greater
difﬁculty of the agency method and differences in the
investment horizon of banks relative to that of users of
agency ratings. Consistency of ratings across a wide variety
of credits may be easier to achieve when the basis is the
relatively easy-to-observe current condition. Also, greater
difﬁculty means through-the-cycle grading entails greater
expense, and for many middle-market credits the extra
expense might render such lending unproﬁtable for banks.
Regarding investment horizon, the rating agencies’ phi-
losophy may reﬂect the historical preponderance of long-
term, buy-and-hold investors among users of ratings. Such
users are naturally most interested in estimates of long-term
credit risk. That banks should naturally have a short-term
orientation is not clear, especially as the maturity of bank
loan commitments has increased steadily over the past
decade or two. If it were not for the considerations of
feasibility and cost, as well as the fact that many banks use
ratings to guide the intensity of monitoring of borrowers,
the banks’ choice of point-in-time grading would be more
debatable.
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borrower. Such single-grade systems might be most
accurately characterized as having an ambiguous or
mixed conceptual basis rather than as clearly measur-
ing either PD or EL. Although an ambiguous basis
may pose no problems when ratings are used mainly
for administrative and reporting purposes and when
the nature of the bank’s business is fairly stable over
time, a clear conceptual foundation becomes more
important as quantitative models of portfolio risk and
proﬁtability are used more heavily and during periods
of rapid change.
In two-dimensional systems, one grade typically
reﬂects PD and the other EL. Banks with such sys-
tems usually ﬁrst determine the borrower’s grade (its
PD) and then set the facility grade equal to the
borrower grade unless the structure of the facility is
such that LIED is substantially better or worse than
‘‘normal.’’ Implicitly, grades on the facility scale
measure EL as the PD associated with the borrower
grade multiplied by a standard or average LIED
(table 1). In this way, a two-dimensional system can
promote precision and consistency in grading by
separately recording a rater’s judgments about PD
and EL rather than mixing them together.
A few banks said they had plans to shift to a
system in which the borrower grade reﬂects PD but
the facility grade explicitly measures LIED. The rater
would assign a facility to one of several LIED cate-
gories on the basis of the likely recovery rates asso-
ciated with various types of collateral, guarantees, or
other considerations associated with the facility’s
structure. EL for a facility would be calculated by
multiplying the borrower’s PD by the facility’s
LIED.8
Rating Scales at Moody’s and S&P
At the agencies, as at many banks, the loss concepts
(PD, LIED, and EL) embedded in the ratings are
somewhat ambiguous. Moody’s states that ‘‘ratings
are intended to serve as indicators or forecasts of the
potential for credit loss because of failure to pay, a
delay in payment, or partial payment.’’ Standard &
Poor’s states that its ratings are an ‘‘opinion of the
general creditworthiness of an obligor, or...o fa n
obligor with respect to a particular...obligation...
8. Systems recording LIED rather than EL as the second grade can
promote precision and consistency in grading. PD-EL systems typi-
cally impose limits on the degree to which differences in loan struc-
ture permit an EL grade to be moved up or down relative to the PD
grade. Such limits can be helpful in restraining raters’ optimism but,
in the case of loans with a genuinely very low expected LIED, such
limits can materially limit the accuracy of risk measurement. Another
beneﬁt of LIED ratings is the fact that raters’ LIED judgments can be
evaluated over time by comparing them to loss experience.
1. Example of a two-dimensional risk rating system



























1—Virtually no risk .. 0 0
2—Low risk ......... .1 .03
3—Moderate risk ..... .3 .09
4—Average risk ...... 1.0 .30
5—Acceptable risk ... 3.0 30 .90
6—Borderline risk ... 6.0 1.80
7—OAEM1 .......... 20.0 6.00
8—Substandard ...... 60.0 18.00
9—Doubtful ......... 100 30.00
1. Other Assets Especially Mentioned.
2. Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s bond rating scales and average one-year default rates
Category
Moody’s Standard & Poor’s
Grade




Average default rate (PD)
per year, 1981–94
(percent)
Investment grade ............................ Aaa .00 AAA .00
Aa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 .03 AA+, AA, AA- .00
A, A1, A2, A3 .01 A+, A, A- .07
Baa, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3 .13 BBB+, BBB, BBB- .25
Below investment grade (‘‘junk’’) ............ Ba,Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 1.42 BB+, BB, BB- 1.17
B, B1, B2, B3 7.62 B+, B, B- 5.39
Caa, Ca, C n.a. CCC, CC, C 19.96
Default ..................................... D . . . D . . .
Note. Grades are listed from less risky to more risky, from top to bottom and
from left to right.
n.a. Not available.
. . . Not applicable.
Source. Moody’s Investors Service Special Report, Corporate Bond
Defaults and Default Rates 1938–1995 (January 1996). Standard & Poor’s
Creditweek Special Report, Corporate Defaults Level Off in 1994 (May 1,
1995).
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reading of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s detailed
descriptions of rating criteria and procedures sug-
gests that the two agencies’ ratings incorporate ele-
ments of PD and LIED but are not precisely EL
measures.9
Risk tends to increase nonlinearly on both bank
and agency scales. For example, on the agency scales,
default rates are low for the least risky grades but rise
rapidly as the grade worsens (table 2).
Administrative Grades
All the banks we interviewed maintain some sort of
internal ‘‘watch’’ list as well as a means of identify-
ing assets that fall into the ‘‘regulatory problem
asset’’ categories (table 3). Although watch and regu-
latory problem-asset designations typically identify
high-risk credits, they have administrative meanings
that are conceptually separate from risk per se. Spe-
cial monitoring activity is usually undertaken for
watch and problem assets, such as formal quarterly
reviews of status and special reports that help senior
bank management monitor and react to important
developments in the portfolio. However, banks may
wish to trigger special monitoring for credits that are
not high-risk and thus may wish to separate adminis-
trative indicators from risk measures (an example
would be a low-risk loan for which an event that
might inﬂuence risk is expected, such as a change in
ownership of the borrower).
Among the ﬁfty largest banks, all but two have
grades corresponding to the regulatory problem-asset
categories Other Assets Especially Mentioned
(OAEM), Substandard, Doubtful, and Loss (some
omit the Loss category).10 All other assets are collec-
tively labeled ‘‘Pass’’ by regulators. The bank super-
visory agencies do not speciﬁcally require that banks
maintain regulatory categories on an internal scale
but do require that recordkeeping be sufﬁcient to
ensure that loans in the regulatory categories can be
quickly and clearly identiﬁed. The two banks that use
procedures not involving internal grades appear to do
so because the regulatory asset categories are not
consistent with the conceptual basis of their own
grades.11 Moreover, banks and regulators may some-
times disagree about the riskiness of individual assets
that fall into the various regulatory grades.12
Watch credits are those that need special monitor-
ing but do not fall in the regulatory problem-asset
grades. Only about half the banks we interviewed
include a watch grade on their internal rating scales.
Others add a watch ﬂag to individual grades, such as
3W versus 3, or simply maintain a watch list sep-
rately, perhaps by adding an identifying ﬁeld to their
computer systems.
9. Moody’s Investors Service, Global Credit Analysis (IFR Pub-
lishing, 1991), p. 73 (emphasis in the original); Standard & Poor’s,
Corporate Ratings Criteria (1998), p. 3. Other rating agencies play
important roles in the marketplace. We omit details of their scales and
practices only for brevity.
10. A few break Substandard into two categories, one for perform-
ing loans and the other for nonperforming loans.
11. Although the deﬁnitions are standardized across banks, our
discussions and inspection of internal documents imply that banks
vary in their internal deﬁnition and use of OAEM. Among the regu-
latory categories, OAEM in particular can have an administrative
dimension as well as a risk dimension. Most loans identiﬁed as
OAEM pose a higher-than-usual degree of risk, but some loans may
be placed in this category for lack of adequate documentation in the
loan ﬁle, which may occur even for loans not posing higher-than-usual
risk. In such cases, once the administrative problem is resolved, the
loan can be upgraded.
12. Examiners review problem loans and evaluate whether they
have been assigned to the proper regulatory problem-asset grades and
also review a sample of Pass credits. Examiners heretofore have
generally not attempted to validate or evaluate internal ratings of Pass
credits.







(OAEM)1 .. Has potential weaknesses that
deserve management’s close
attention.
If left uncorrected, these potential
weaknesses may, at some future
date, result in the deterioration of




Substandard ..... Inadequately protected by current
worth/paying capacity of obligor or
collateral. Well-deﬁned weaknesses
jeopardize liquidation of the debt.
Distinct possibility that bank will
sustain some loss if deﬁciencies are
not corrected.
15
Doubtful ........ Allweaknesses inherent in
substandard, AND collection/
liquidation in full, on basis of
currently existing conditions, is
highly questionable or improbable.
Speciﬁc pending factors may
strengthen credit; treatment as loss
deferred until exact status can be
determined.
50
Loss ............ Uncollectible and of such little
value that continuance as bankable
asset is not warranted.
Credit may have recovery or
salvage value, but not
practical/desirable to defer writing
it off even though partial recovery
may be effected in future.
100
Note. Assets that do not fall into one of these categories are termed Pass by
the federal banking regulators.
1. Other Assets Especially Mentioned.
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The number of grades on internal scales varies con-
siderably across banks. In addition, even where the
number of grades is identical on two different banks’
scales, the risk associated with the same grades (for
example, two loans graded 4) is almost always differ-
ent. Among the ﬁfty largest banks, the number of
Pass grades varies from two to the low twenties. The
median is ﬁve Pass grades, including a watch grade
if any (chart 1). Among the ten largest banks, the
median number of Pass grades is six and the mini-
mum is four. As noted, the vast majority of large
banks also include three or four regulatory problem-
asset grades on their internal scales.
Internal rating systems with larger numbers of
grades are more costly to operate because of the extra
work required to distinguish ﬁner degrees of risk.
Banks making heavy use of ratings in analytical
activities are most likely to choose to bear these costs
because ﬁne distinctions are especially valuable in
such activities (however, at least a moderate number
of Pass grades is useful even for internal reporting
purposes). Banks that increase their analytical use of
ratings may persist for a while with a relatively small
number of Pass grades because the costs of changing
rating systems can be large. Nonetheless, those banks
that have recently redesigned their rating systems
have all increased the number of grades.13
The proportion of grades used to distinguish among
relatively low risk credits versus the proportion used
to distinguish among the riskier Pass credits tends to
differ with the business mix of the bank. Among
banks we interviewed, those that do a signiﬁcant
share of their commercial business in the large corpo-
rate loan market tend to have more grades reﬂecting
investment-grade risks. The allocation of grades
between the investment-grade and below-investment-
grade categories tends to be more even at banks
doing mostly middle-market business.14 The differ-
ences are not large: The median middle-market bank
has three internal grades corresponding to agency
grades of BBB-/Baa3 or better and three riskier
grades, whereas the median bank with a substantial
large-corporate business has four investment grades
and two junk grades. Such a difference in rating
system focus is sensible in that an ability to make ﬁne
distinctions among low-risk borrowers is quite impor-
tant in the highly competitive large-corporate lending
market. In the middle market, fewer borrowers are
perceived as posing AAA, AA, or even A levels of
risk, so such distinctions are less crucial.
However, a glance at table 2 reveals that a good
distinction among risk levels in the below-
investment-grade range is important for all banks.
For example, the range of default rates spanned by
the agency grades BB+/Ba1 through B-/B3 is orders
of magnitude larger than the risk range for, say,
A+/A1 through BBB-/Baa3, and yet the median large
bank we interviewed uses only two or three grades to
span the below-investment-grade range, one of them
perhaps being a watch grade. More granularity—ﬁner
distinctions of risk, especially among riskier assets—
can enhance a bank’s ability to analyze its portfolio
risk posture and to construct accurate models of the
proﬁtability of its broader business relationships with
borrowers.
Systems with many Pass categories are less useful
when loans or other exposures tend to be concen-
trated in one or two grades. Among large banks,
sixteen institutions, or 36 percent, assign half or more
of their rated loans to a single risk grade (chart 2).
Such systems appear to contribute little to the under-
standing and monitoring of risk posture.15
13. The average number of grades on internal scales appears to
have increased somewhat during the past decade. See Gregory F.
Udell, Designing the Optimal Loan Review Policy: An Analysis of
Loan Review in Midwestern Banks (Prochnow Reports, Madison,
Wis., 1987), p. 18.
14. The term ‘‘large corporate’’ includes nonﬁnancial ﬁrms with
large annual sales volumes as well as large ﬁnancial institutions,
national governments, and large nonproﬁt institutions. Certainly the
Fortune 500 ﬁrms fall into this category. Middle-market borrowers are
smaller, but the precise boundary between large and middle-market
and between middle-market and small business borrowers varies by
bank.
15. Such failure to distinguish degrees of risk was recently cited in
Federal Reserve examination guidance as a potentially signiﬁcant
shortcoming in a large institution’s credit risk management process.
See Supervision and Regulation Letter SR 98-18, ‘‘Lending Standards
for Commercial Loans’’ (June 23, 1998). For additional information
1. Fifty largest U.S. banks, distributed by number
of Pass grades







Note. Shown are the forty-six banks for which this measure was available.
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(and, based on discussions with supervisory staff,
other banks as well) expressed at least some desire to
increase the number of grades on their scales and to
reduce the extent to which credits are concentrated in
one or two grades. Two kinds of plans were voiced:
Addition of a +/- modiﬁer to all existing grades, and
a split of existing riskier grades into a larger number
of newly deﬁned grades, leaving the low-risk grades
unchanged.16 The +/- modiﬁer approach is favored
by many because grade deﬁnitions are modiﬁed
rather than completely reorganized. For example, the
basic meaning of a 5 stays the same, but it becomes
possible to distinguish between a strong and a weak 5
with grades of 5+ and 5-. This approach limits the
disruption of staff understanding of each grade’s
meaning (as noted below, such understanding is
largely cultural rather than being formally written).
THE OPERATING DESIGN OF RATING SYSTEMS
In essentially all cases, the human judgment exer-
cised by experienced bank staff is central to the
assignment of a rating. Banks thus design the opera-
tional ﬂow of the rating process in ways that are
aimed at promoting the accuracy and consistency of
ratings while not unduly restricting the exercise of
judgment. Balance between these opposing impera-
tives appears to be struck at each institution on the
basis of cost considerations, the nature of the bank’s
commercial business lines, the bank’s uses of ratings,
and the role of the rating system in maintaining the
bank’s credit culture.
Key operating design issues in striking the balance
include the organizational division of responsibility
for grading (line staff or credit staff), the nature of
reviews of ratings to detect errors, the organizational
location of ultimate authority over grade assign-
ments, the role of external ratings and statistical
models in the rating process, and the formality of the
process and speciﬁcity of formal rating deﬁnitions.
What Exposures Are Rated?
At most banks, ratings are produced for all commer-
cial or institutional loans (that is, not consumer
loans), and in some cases for large loans to house-
holds or individuals for which underwriting proce-
dures are similar to those for commercial loans. Rated
assets thus include commercial and industrial loans
and other facilities, commercial lease ﬁnancings,
commercial real estate loans, loans to foreign com-
mercial and sovereign entities, loans and other facili-
ties to ﬁnancial institutions, and sometimes loans
made by ‘‘private banking’’ units. In general, ratings
are applied to those types of loans for which under-
writing requires large elements of subjective analysis.
Overview of the Rating Process in Relation to
Credit Approval and Review
Ratings are typically assigned (or reafﬁrmed) at the
time of each underwriting or credit approval action.
The analysis supporting the ratings is inseparable
from the analysis supporting the underwriting or
credit approval decision. In addition, the rating and
underwriting processes, while logically separate, are
intertwined. The rating assignment inﬂuences the
approval process in that underwriting limits and
approval requirements depend on the grade, while
approvers of a credit are expected to review and
conﬁrm the grade. For example, an individual staff
member typically proposes a risk grade as part of the
pre-approval process for a new credit. The proposed
grade is then approved or modiﬁed at the same time
about current bank lending practices, see William F. Treacy, ‘‘The
Signiﬁcance of Recent Changes In Underwriting Standards: Evidence
from the Loan Quality Assessment Project,’’ Federal Reserve System
Supervisory Staff Report (June 1998); and U.S. Comptroller of the
Currency, 1998 Survey of Credit Underwriting Practices (National
Credit Committee, 1998).
16. At the time of the interviews, however, the majority of the
banks voicing plans to increase the number of their grades had no
active effort in progress. Many of those institutions actively moving to
increase the number of their Pass grades do not now have concentra-
tions in a single category.
2. Fifty largest U.S. banks, distributed by percentage
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Note. Shown are the forty-ﬁve banks for which this measure was relevant.
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meet the requirements embedded in the bank’s credit
policies. In nearly all cases, approval requires assent
by individuals with requisite ‘‘signature authority’’
rather than by a committee. The number and level of
signatures needed for approval typically depend on
the size and (proposed) risk rating of the transaction:
In general, less risky loans require fewer and perhaps
lower-level signatures. In addition, signature require-
ments may vary according to the line of business
involved and the type of credit being approved.17
After approval, the individual that assigned the
initial grade is generally responsible for monitoring
the loan and for changing the grade promptly as the
condition of the borrower changes. Exposures falling
into the regulatory grades are an exception at some
institutions, where monitoring and grading of such
loans becomes the responsibility of a separate unit,
such as a workout or loan review unit.
Who Assigns and Monitors Ratings, and Why?
Ratings are initially assigned either by relationship
managers or the credit staff. Relationship managers
(RMs) are lending ofﬁcers (line staff) responsible for
the marketing of banking services. They report to
lines of business that reﬂect the strategic orientation
of the bank.18 All institutions evaluate the perfor-
mance of RMs—and thus set their compensation—on
the basis of the proﬁtability of the relationships in
question, although the methods of assessing proﬁt-
ability and determining compensation vary. Even
when proﬁtability measures are not risk-sensitive,
ratings assigned by an RM can affect his or her
compensation.19 Thus, in the absence of sufﬁcient
controls, RMs may have incentives to assign ratings
in a manner inconsistent with the bank’s interests.
The credit staff is responsible for approving loans
and the ratings assigned, especially in the case of
larger loans; for monitoring portfolio credit quality
and sometimes for regular review of individual expo-
sures; and sometimes for directly assigning the
ratings of individual exposures. The credit staff is
genuinely independent of sales and marketing func-
tions when the two have separate reporting structures
(that is, ‘‘chains of command’’) and when the perfor-
mance assessment of the credit staff is linked to the
quality of the bank’s credit exposure rather than to
loan volume or business line or customer proﬁtabil-
ity. Some banks apportion the credit staff across
speciﬁc line-of-business groups. Such arrangements
allow for closer working relationships but in some
cases lead to linkage of the credit staff’s compensa-
tion or performance assessment with proﬁtability of
the business line; in such cases, incentive conﬂicts
like those experienced by RMs can arise. At other
banks, RMs and independent credit staff produce
ratings as partners and are held jointly accountable.
Whether such partnerships are effective in restraining
incentive conﬂicts is not clear.
The primary responsibility for rating assignments
varies widely among the banks we interviewed. RMs
have the primary responsibility at about 40 percent of
the banks, although in such cases the credit staff may
review proposed ratings as part of the loan approval
process, especially for larger exposures.20 At 15 per-
cent of interviewed banks the credit staff assigns all
initial ratings, whereas the credit staff and RMs rate
in partnership at another 20 percent or so. About
30 percent of interviewed banks divide the responsi-
bility: The credit staff has sole responsibility for
rating large exposures, and RMs alone or in partner-
ship with the credit staff rate middle-market loans. In
principle, both the credit staff and RMs use the same
rating deﬁnitions and basic criteria, but the different
natures of the two types of credit may lead to some
divergence of practice.
A bank’s business mix appears to be a primary
determinant of whether RMs or the credit staff are
primarily responsible for ratings. Those banks we
interviewed that lend mainly in the middle market
usually give RMs primary responsibility for ratings.
Such banks emphasized informational efﬁciency,
cost, and accountability as key reasons for their
choice of organizational structure. Especially in the
case of loans to medium-size and smaller ﬁrms, the
RM was said to be in the best position to appraise the
condition of the borrower on an ongoing basis and
thus to ensure that ratings are updated in a timely
manner. Requiring that the credit staff be equally well
informed adds costs and may introduce lags into the
process by which ratings of such smaller credits are
updated.
17. If those asked to provide signatures believe that a loan should
be assigned a riskier internal rating than initially, additional signatures
may be required in accordance with policy requirements. Thus, dis-
agreement over the rating can alter the approval requirements for the
loan in question.
18. Lines of business may be deﬁned by the size of the business
customer (such as large corporate), by the customer’s primary indus-
try (such as health care), or by the type of product being provided
(such as commercial real estate loans).
19. For example, because loan policies often include size limits
that depend on ratings, approval of a large loan proposed by an RM
may be much more likely if it is assigned a relatively low risk rating.
20. At most banks, RMs have signature authority for relatively
small loans, and the credit staff might review the ratings of only a
fraction of small loans at origination.
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staff assigns ratings tend to have a substantial pres-
ence in the large corporate market. Placing the rating
process primarily in the hands of the credit staff
offers greater assurance that grading will be purely on
the basis of risk, without coloration by possible rami-
ﬁcations for customer or business line proﬁtability. In
addition, because the credit staff is small relative to
the number of RMs and is focused entirely on risk
assessment, it is in a better position to achieve consis-
tency in its ratings (that is, to assign similar grades to
similarly risky loans, regardless of their other charac-
teristics). Moreover, the costs of having the credit
staff perform all analysis are small relative to the
revenues generated by large corporate loan transac-
tions. In contrast, such costs can be large relative to
the transaction revenues for middle-market loans.
Our impression is that middle-market lending rep-
resents a much larger share of the business of banks
we did not interview. If the pattern described above
holds, the proportion of all large banks using RM-
centered rating processes is probably higher than
among our interviewees. Unfortunately, policy docu-
ments for those we did not interview generally do not
reveal details of this aspect of the process.
Almost all the banks we interviewed are at least
experimenting with consumer-loan-style credit scor-
ing models for small commercial loans. For expo-
sures smaller than some cutoff value, such models are
either a tool in the rating process or are the sole basis
for the rating. If, however, models are the sole basis,
performing loans are usually assigned to a single
grade on the internal rating scale rather than making
grade assignments sensitive to the score value.
How Do They Arrive at Ratings?
Both assigners and reviewers of ratings follow the
same basic thought process in arriving at a rating for
a given exposure. The rater considers both the risk
posed by the borrower and aspects of the facility’s
structure. In appraising the borrower, the rater gathers
information about its quantitative and qualitative
characteristics, compares them with the standards for
each grade, and then weights them in choosing a
borrower grade. The comparative process often is
as much one of looking across borrowers as one of
looking across characteristics of different grades:
That is, the rater may look for already-rated loans
with characteristics close to those of the loan being
rated and then set the rating to the grade already
assigned to such borrowers.
Models and Judgment
Although in principle the analysis of risk factors
may be done by a mechanical model, in practice the
rating process at almost all banks relies heavily on
judgment. We suspect most banks are hesitant to
make models the centerpiece of their rating systems
for three reasons: (1) Different models would be
required for each asset class and perhaps for differ-
ent geographic regions; (2) data to support estimation
of such models is currently rarely available; and
(3) the reliability of such models would become
apparent only over time, exposing the bank to
possibly substantial risks in the interim. Those few
banks moving toward heavy reliance on models
appear to feel that models produce more consistent
ratings and that, in the long run, operating costs will
be reduced in that less labor will be required to
produce ratings.
As part of their judgmental evaluation, most of the
banks we interviewed either use statistical models of
borrower default probability as an input (about three-
fourths do so) or take into consideration any available
agency rating of the borrower (at least half, and
probably more, do so). Such use of external points of
comparison is common for large corporate borrowers
because they are most likely to be externally rated
and because statistical default probability models are
more readily available for such borrowers. In addi-
tion, as described further below, many banks use
external ratings or models in calibrating their rating
systems and in identifying likely mistakes in grade
assignments.
Factors Considered
Bank personnel base their decisions to assign a par-
ticular rating on the criteria that deﬁne each grade,
which are articulated as standards for a number
of speciﬁc risk factors. For example, a criterion
for assignment of a grade ‘‘3’’ might be that the
borrower’s leverage ratio must be smaller than some
value. Risk factors include the borrower’s ﬁnancial
condition, size, industry, and position within the
industry; the reliability of the borrower’s ﬁnancial
statements and the quality of its management; ele-
ments of transaction structure (for example, collat-
eral); and miscellaneous other factors. The risk fac-
tors are generally the same as those considered in
deciding whether to extend a loan and are similar to
the factors considered by rating agencies. Banks vary
somewhat in the particular factors they consider and
in the weight they give each factor. What follows is a
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bank among those we interviewed.21
Financial statement analysis is central to apprais-
ing the likely adequacy of future cash ﬂow and thus
the ability of the borrower to service its debt. The
focus of analysis is on the borrower’s debt service
capacity, taking account of its free cash ﬂow, the
liquidity of its balance sheet, and the ﬁrm’s access to
sources of ﬁnance other than the bank. Historical
(and to a lesser extent, projected) earnings, operating
cash ﬂow, interest coverage, and leverage are typi-
cally analyzed, with exact deﬁnitions of ﬁnancial
ratios used in the analysis varying across banks and,
in some cases, across borrowers or loan types. The
analysis yields an assessment of the difference
between current or projected performance and liquid-
ity on the one hand and projected debt service obliga-
tions on the other. The larger the cushion, in general,
the more favorable the rating.
As a context for ﬁnancial statement analysis, the
characteristics of the borrower’s industry are often
considered (such as cyclicality, general volatility, and
trends in cash ﬂow and proﬁtability). Indeed, the
ﬁnancial analysis often includes a formal comparison
of the borrower’s ﬁnancial ratios to prevailing indus-
try norms.22 Firms in declining industries are consid-
ered more risky, as are those in highly competitive
industries, whereas ﬁrms with diversiﬁed lines of
business are viewed as less risky. A related factor, the
borrower’s position in its industry, is also an impor-
tant factor in determining ratings. Those borrowers
with substantial market power or that are perceived to
be ‘‘market leaders’’ in other respects are considered
less risky because they are thought to be less vulner-
able to competitive pressure.
One of the most important reasons that rating is
usually a judgmental process is that the details of
ﬁnancial statement analysis vary with the borrower’s
other characteristics. In contrast, statistical models of
default probability tend to analyze ﬁxed sets of ﬁnan-
cial ratios and to apply ﬁxed weights to each ratio in
arriving at a default probability, perhaps with some
variation in weights by industry. Subjective factors
play at most a minimal role. This relative inﬂexibility
of models leads most banks to regard their results
only as generally suggestive of an appropriate rating.
When internal ratings are produced primarily by
models, several models may be needed for different
borrowers or loan types and continual tuning of the
models is likely to be required.
Raters also appraise the quality of ﬁnancial infor-
mation provided by the borrower. For example, rat-
ers have much more conﬁdence in ﬁnancial state-
ments that are audited by a major accounting ﬁrm
than in those that are compiled or unconsolidated or
that are audited but accompanied by important quali-
ﬁcations. When statement quality is poor or uncer-
tain, ﬁnancial analysis may produce a distorted view
of the borrower’s condition, adding substantially to
risk.
A primary difference between banks and public
rating agencies is whether the ﬁnancial analysis is
keyed to a downside (or ‘‘stress’’) scenario or to a
‘‘base’’ (or ‘‘most likely’’) case. As noted previously,
banks assign ratings on the basis of the borrower’s
current condition and most likely outlook, whereas
the rating agencies assign grades on the basis of a
downside scenario.
In another departure from practice at the rating
agencies, most banks formally consider both ﬁrm
size (sales revenue or total assets) and the book or
market dollar value of a ﬁrm’s equity in assigning
ratings. Interviewees noted that small ﬁrms—
including many that would be considered middle
market—usually have limited access to external
ﬁnance and often have few or no assets that can be
sold in an emergency without disrupting operations.
In contrast, larger ﬁrms were characterized as having
more ready access to alternative ﬁnancing, more sale-
able assets, and a more ﬁrmly established market
presence. For these reasons, many banks require that
small borrowers be assigned relatively risky grades
even if their ﬁnancial characteristics might suggest a
more favorable rating.
Almost all internal rating systems cite the borrow-
er’s management as an important consideration in
assigning the risk grade. Such assessments are nec-
essarily subjective and may reveal weaknesses in a
number of areas related to competence, experience,
integrity, or succession plans. Vulnerability of man-
agement to the retirement or departure of key indi-
viduals is usually considered. Some institutions (simi-
lar to the rating agencies) appear to give considerable
weight to the rater’s appraisal of management’s abil-
ity and willingness to manage the ﬁrm to achieve a
high level of ﬁnancial performance throughout the
business cycle and to its attitude toward protecting
the interests of lenders.
21. We reviewed the written criteria for those banks among the
ﬁfty largest that we did not interview. Our experience with inter-
viewed banks indicates that conclusions should be drawn with care
from written documents alone. However, the description of risk fac-
tors herein is probably representative of the factors used by almost all
large banks.
22. Staff at the banks interviewed appeared to be well aware of the
potential pitfalls of such comparisons. For example, a borrower with a
ﬁve-year history of stable cash ﬂow might still be considered rather
risky if the particular ﬁve-year period contained no recession and the
borrower’s industry is highly cyclical.
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is an important determinant of the rating in some
cases. Especially when transfer risk or political risk is
substantial, general practice seems to be that a bor-
rower’s grade may be no less risky than the grade
assigned to the borrower’s country by a special unit
in the bank. Such country grades can be signiﬁcantly
affected by the country risk grade assigned by regula-
tors as part of an annual cycle.
Ratings may also be inﬂuenced by exposure to
event risks, such as litigation, environmental liability,
or changes in law or national policy.
A handful of considerations reﬂecting the structure
of the transaction being rated also enter into consider-
ation because they can affect LIED. Adequate collat-
eral can in many cases improve the rating, particu-
larly if that collateral is in the form of cash or easily
marketed assets such as U.S. Treasury securities.23
Guarantees can generally enhance the rating as well,
but not beyond the rating that would be assigned to
the guarantor if it were the borrower. The term to
maturity of the loan is a factor in grade assignments
at only a few large banks. Similarly, few banks adjust
the risk grade on the basis of other elements of the
loan structure, such as ﬁnancial covenants.
Written and Cultural Deﬁnitions
Large banks’ written deﬁnitions of ratings specify
risk factors to be used in assigning ratings, but usu-
ally the discussion is brief and broadly worded, and
gives virtually no guidance regarding the weight to
place on each factor.24 According to interviewees,
such brevity arises partly because some factors are
qualitative but also because the speciﬁcs of quantita-
tive factors and the weights on factors can differ a
great deal across assets. Some noted that the number
of permutations is so great that attempting to write
them down would be counterproductive. Instead,
raters learn to exercise judgment in selecting and
weighting factors through training, mentoring, and
especially by experience. The actual meanings of
written rating deﬁnitions and the speciﬁcs of assign-
ing ratings take the form of common, unwritten
knowledge embedded in the bank’s credit culture.
Formality of Procedure
Most banks require some sort of written justiﬁcation
of the grade as part of the loan approval package, but
a few employ forms or grids on which the rater
identiﬁes the relevant factors. Such forms or grids
may also suggest a structure for the rating analy-
sis and serve to remind the rater to consider a broad
set of risk factors and to weight them appropri-
ately. The stated motivation for such formalism is
better consistency across asset types and geographic
regions.
Reviews, Reviewers, and the ‘‘Keepers of the
Flame’’
Reviews of ratings are threefold: Monitoring by those
who assign the initial rating of a transaction, regu-
larly scheduled reviews of ratings for groups of expo-
sures, and occasional reviews of a business unit’s
rating assignments by a loan review unit. Monitoring
may not be continuous, but it is intended to keep the
rater well enough informed to recommend changes to
the internal risk grade in a timely fashion as needed.
All institutions interviewed emphasized that failure
to recommend changes to risk grades in a timely
fashion when warranted is viewed as a signiﬁcant
performance failure for the relationship manager, the
credit staff, or both, and can be grounds for internally
imposed penalties.25
Most institutions also conduct annual or quarterly
reviews of each exposure, which may be in addition
to those that are part of the credit approval process at
the time facilities are renewed. The form of regular
reviews ranges from a periodic signoff by the rela-
tionship manager working alone to a committee
review involving both line and credit staff. Banks
with substantial large-corporate portfolios tend to
review all exposures in a given industry at the same
time, with reviews either by the credit specialist
for that industry or by a committee. Such industry
23. Different rules are often used in grading certain classes of
transactions, especially asset-based lending. At best, asset-based bor-
rowers would be only marginally acceptable risks for banks in the
absence of the detailed ﬁeld audits of collateral that asset-based
lenders demand. With such close monitoring, which typically includes
some degree of bank dominion over accounts receivable and inven-
tory, the expected loss associated with a default is dramatically
reduced, and a more favorable rating can be assigned.
24. Written deﬁnitions are intended to address a broad range of
credit classes and borrower types. At a few banks, a supplementary
grid of nonbinding quantitative standards or ﬁnancial ratios is pro-
vided (for example, for leverage or debt service coverage), but guid-
ance is generally sketchy as to how such ratios should be weighted
against each other or against more qualitative considerations. Inter-
viewees indicated that even when reference grids are provided, the
ratios and standards are generally not binding. Similarly, some banks
provide supplemental descriptions of risk factors to be considered for
particular business lines or loan types, but such supplements often
closely resemble the core risk rating deﬁnitions.
25. Updates to the risk grade usually require approvals similar to
those required to initiate or renew a transaction.
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ing inconsistently rated credits.
Ratings are also checked by banks’ independent
loan review units, which usually have the ﬁnal
authority to set grades. Such departments examine
each business unit’s underwriting practices, and its
adherence to administrative and credit policies, on a
one- to three-year cycle. Not unlike bank examiners,
the loan review staff typically inspects only a sample
of loans in each line of business. Although the sam-
pling procedures used by different institutions vary
somewhat, most institutions weight samples toward
loans perceived to be riskier (such as those in high-
risk loan grades), with the primary focus on regu-
latory problem-asset categories. In general, however,
an attempt is made to review some loans made by
each lender in the unit being inspected.26
At a few banks, the loan review unit inspects
internal ratings assigned to Pass loans only to conﬁrm
that such loans need not be placed in the watch or
regulatory grades. Thus, as a practical matter, the
loan review unit at these banks has little role in
maintaining the accuracy of assignments within the
Pass grades. In this regard, the loan review staff at
these banks follows the same pattern as bank examin-
ers. These banks tend to make relatively little use of
Pass grade information in managing the bank.
Because operational rating deﬁnitions and proce-
dures are embedded in bank culture rather than writ-
ten down in detail, the loan review function at most
institutions is critical to maintaining the discipline
and consistency of the overall rating process. The
loan review unit, as the principal entity looking at
ratings across business lines and asset types, often
bears much of the burden of detecting discrepancies
in the operational meaning of ratings across lines.
Because the loan review unit at most institutions
has the ﬁnal say about ratings, it can exert a major
inﬂuence on the culturally understood deﬁnition of
grades.27 Typically, when the loan review staff ﬁnds
grading errors, it not only makes corrections but
works with the relevant staff to ﬁnd the reasons for
the errors. Misunderstandings are thus corrected as
they become evident.28
Loan review units generally do not require that all
ratings produced by the line or credit staff be iden-
tical to the ratings that loan review judges to be
correct. At almost all banks we interviewed, loan
review units treat only two-grade discrepancies for
individual loans as warranting discussion. With a
typical large bank having four to six Pass categories,
such a policy permits large discrepancies for indi-
vidual exposures, potentially spanning two or more
whole letter grades on the Standard & Poor’s scale.
However, most institutions interviewed indicated that
a pattern of one-grade disagreements within a given
business unit—for example, a regional ofﬁce of a
given line of business—can lead to a quick and
decisive response.
All interviewees emphasized that the number of
cases in which the loan review staff changes ratings is
usually relatively small, ranging from essentially
none to roughly 10 percent of the loans reviewed,
except in the wake of large cultural disruptions such
as mergers or major changes in the rating system. A
low percentage of discrepancies does not imply that
the loan review function is unimportant but rather
that, in well-functioning systems, the cultural mean-
ing of ratings tends to remain stable and widely
understood. One element of a well-functioning sys-
tem is the rater’s expectation that the loan review
staff will be conducting inspections.
The interviews also indicated that differences of
opinion tend to become more common when the
number of ratings on the scale is greater, creating
more situations in which ‘‘reasonable people can
disagree.’’ More direct linkage between the risk grade
assigned and the incentive compensation of relation-
ship managers also tends to produce more disagree-
ments. In both cases, resolution of disagreements
may consume more resources.
Loan review units usually have a role apart from
inspections in maintaining rating system integrity.
For example, when a relationship manager and the
credit staff are unable to agree on a rating for a new
loan, they will consult with the loan review unit on
how to resolve the dispute. In its consultative role,
the loan review staff guides the interpretations of
rating deﬁnitions and standards and, in novel situa-
tions, establishes and reﬁnes the deﬁnitions.
26. For an analysis of the broader role of loan review units, see
Udell, Designing the Optimal Loan Review Policy; and Gregory F.
Udell, ‘‘Loan Quality, Commercial Loan Review, and Loan Ofﬁcer
Contracting,’’ Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 3 (July 1989),
pp. 367–82.
27. Interviews and discussions with supervisory staff suggest, how-
ever, that the notion of ‘‘ﬁnal say’’ is murkier than suggested by
written policy and stated practice. Important informal elements of
rating processes, such as negotiation among various organizational
units, may lead to a consensus rating or understanding. Such negotia-
tion would not compromise the integrity of the rating system so long
as loan review retains its independence and objectivity. Such informal
understandings might make it more difﬁcult, however, for an outsider
to understand (much less validate) the ratings being assigned.
28. The loan review staff generally uses the same deﬁnitions of risk
grades, at the same level of detail, as relationship managers and the
independent credit staff. At a few banks, however, loan review also
relies on older policy documents that are far more detailed than
current policies. Thus, the older, more speciﬁc policies remain essen-
tially in effect.
908 Federal Reserve Bulletin November 1998Because of its central role in maintaining the integ-
rity of the rating system, the loan review unit must
have both substantial independence and staff mem-
bers who are well versed in the bank’s credit culture
and the meaning of ratings. All loan review units at
banks we interviewed report to the chief auditor or
chief credit ofﬁcer of the bank, and many periodically
brief the board (or a committee thereof) on the results
of their reviews.
Loan review units may be less critical to the integ-
rity of rating systems at banks that are primarily in
the business of making large corporate loans and at
which all exposures are rated by a relatively small,
highly independent credit staff. Although few banks
currently ﬁt this description, they provide an interest-
ing contrast. Such banks’ credit units tend to conduct
the annual industry-focused reviews mentioned previ-
ously and thus are likely to detect rating discrepan-
cies. Having such reviews conducted by broadly
based committees rather than only by industry spe-
cialists tends to restrain any drift in the meaning of
ratings as applied to different industries. In such
circumstances, the small credit staff is in a good
position to function as the ‘‘keeper of the ﬂame’’ with
regard to the credit culture because it essentially
carries out the key rating oversight functions of tradi-
tional loan review units.
Rating Systems and Credit Culture
‘‘Credit culture’’ refers to an implicit understanding
among bank personnel that certain standards of
underwriting and loan management must be main-
tained, even in the face of constant pressures to
increase revenues and bring in new business. Mainte-
nance of a credit culture can be difﬁcult, especially at
very large banks serving many customers over a wide
area. Of necessity, substantial authority must be dele-
gated to mid-level and junior personnel, and undue
relaxation of standards may not appear in the form of
loan losses for some time.
At some of the banks we interviewed, senior man-
agers indicated that the internal rating system is at
least partly designed to promote and maintain the
overall credit culture. At such banks, relationship
managers are held accountable for credit quality
partly by having them rate all credits, including large
exposures that might be more efﬁciently rated by the
credit staff. Strong review processes aim to identify
and discipline relationship managers who produce
inaccurate ratings. Such a setup provides strong
incentives for the individual most responsible for
negotiating with the borrower to assess risk properly
and to think hard about credit issues at each stage of
a credit relationship rather than relying entirely on
the credit staff. An emphasis on culture as a critical
consideration in designing the rating system was
most common among institutions that had suffered
serious problems with asset quality in the past ten or
ﬁfteen years.
Tensions can arise when rating systems both main-
tain culture and support sophisticated modeling and
analysis. As noted, the latter applications introduce
pressures for architectures involving ﬁne distinctions
of risk, and the frequency of legitimate disagreements
about ratings is likely to be higher when systems
have a large number of Pass grades. If not properly
handled by senior management and the loan review
unit, a rating system redesign that increases the num-
ber of grades may make cultural norms fuzzier and
the rating system less useful in maintaining the credit
culture.
Mergers and Expense Pressure
Some of our interviews involved banks that had
recently been involved in mergers, and the dis-
cussions clearly indicated that mergers can cause
upheaval in credit processes and systems, credit cul-
ture, and traditional sources of rating discipline. After
a rating system architecture is chosen for the com-
bined institution, mechanical issues of converting the
predecessor banks’ ratings to the new scale can be
challenging, especially when the predecessors’ rat-
ings of the same borrower suggest differing assess-
ments of that borrower’s risk. Cultural disruptions
arising from the merger are usually even more prob-
lematic than the mechanical issues because, as noted,
the operational deﬁnitions of ratings are a matter of
culture. Even if the architecture of one of the prede-
cessors is used as-is, the staff of the other bank must
absorb and adjust to the new culture.
Merging institutions face a difﬁcult choice between
moving very quicky to convert the ratings of all
assets to the new system, in which case stresses are
high, and converting the ratings over time, which
reduces the intensity of stress but also can reduce the
reliability of internal rating information during the
longer transition. In one version of the slower transi-
tion, which is especially common when a large bank
acquires a much smaller bank, all of the acquired
bank’s performing loans are assigned to the riskiest
nonwatch Pass grade. Each loan is then reassigned as
appropriate at the time of its next review. Although
such a practice may be viewed as conservative, it
masks the true risk posture of the bank during the
Credit Risk Rating at Large U.S. Banks 909transition period. Regardless of the speed of transi-
tion, loan review units are under substantial pressure
during and immediately after the transition.
Expense control has also been a focus of the bank-
ing industry in recent years. The emphasis on econ-
omy naturally puts pressure on the resources devoted
to operating and maintaining the rating system, and
especially to reviews. Although reviews can be cur-
tailed or eliminated in the short run without apparent
damage to rating system integrity, inadequate review
activity may lead to biased and inconsistent ratings
over the longer term. Another possible expense-
reduction strategy is to rely more heavily on statisti-
cal models in assigning ratings, reducing the degree
of judgment and, thus, the amount of labor required
to produce each rating. The long-run success of such
a strategy depends on the adequacy of the models,
including their ability to incorporate subjective fac-
tors and their robustness over the business cycle. Our
impression is that, at present, such adequacy is
uncertain.
Summary Observations on Operating Design
The rating process has many interlinked elements,
as illustrated in diagram 1. At almost all large banks,
internal rating systems rely importantly on the judg-
ment of staff operating with relatively little written
guidance. The operational deﬁnition of each grade
is largely an element of credit culture that is deter-
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review units, are crucial for maintaining the culture
in that the feedback they give is critical to common
understanding and discipline. The credit culture can
be disturbed or unbalanced by changes in the incen-
tives faced by the staff; such changes typically arise
whenever the rating system is required to support
additional functions or uses. The systems of banks at
which all ratings are assigned by credit staff are
relatively immune to such shocks, but the important
role of middle-market loans in most banks’ portfolios
often makes rating assignment by relationship man-
agers cost-effective. In the latter case, the rating
system’s resilience to shocks depends to a consider-
able extent on the loan review unit’s ability to detect
and correct problems in a timely manner. Strong
support of loan review by senior management and
boards of directors appears to be quite important.
Points of external comparison, such as agency
ratings or results of statistical models of borrower
default probability, can be helpful in maintaining the
integrity of internal ratings. A few banks are moving
toward models as the primary basis for internal
ratings. Such an operating design largely removes the
problems of culture maintenance and conﬂicting
incentives that make management of judgmental
rating systems challenging. However, the ability of
models to produce sufﬁciently accurate ratings for
the broad range of assets on the typical large bank’s
balance sheet remains in question.
BANK SYSTEMS RELATIVE TO RATING AGENCY
SYSTEMS
Credit risk ratings have played an important role in
capital markets for most of the twentieth century.
Ratings of publicly issued bonds were ﬁrst produced
during the early 1900s by predecessors of the current
rating agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. In
the decades after 1920, other agencies, both domestic
and foreign, were formed and commenced publica-
tion of ratings. Today a variety of instruments are
rated, such as commercial paper, bank certiﬁcates of
deposit, commercial loans, and hybrid instruments.
Agency and bank rating systems differ substan-
tially, mainly because rating agencies themselves
make no investments and thus are not a party to
transactions between borrowers and lenders. Their
revenue comes from the sale of publications and from
fees paid by issuers of debt. Such fees can be substan-
tial: S&P’s fee for rating a public corporate debt issue
ranges from $25,000 to more than $125,000, with the
usual fee being 0.0325 percent of the face amount
of the issue. Fees are a reﬂection of the substantial
resources the agencies typically devote to producing
each rating, especially the initial rating.
At banks, the costs of producing ratings must be
covered by revenues on credit products. Thus,
although a bank might expend resources at a rate
similar to that of the rating agencies when underwrit-
ing and rating very large loans, the expenditure of so
much labor for middle-market loans would make the
business unproﬁtable.
Agency ratings are used by a large number and
variety of parties for many different purposes. To
ensure wide usage (and thus their ability to collect
fees), the agencies strive to be deliberate, accurate,
and evenhanded. They also produce relatively ﬁne
distinctions of risk on rating scales having architec-
tures and meanings that are stable over time. Accu-
racy and evenhandedness are crucial to the rating
agency business—for example, an agency suspected
of producing the most favorable ratings for those that
pay the highest fees would soon be out of business:
Investors would cease paying attention to its ratings,
and issuers would thus have no incentive to pay.
Similarly, changing the rating scale can confuse
the public and at least temporarily degrade the value
of an agency’s product. The agencies also have incen-
tives to be relatively open about their process and to
produce written explanations of each rating assign-
ment or change. Clarity helps investors use the rat-
ings and helps assure issuers that the process is as
objective as possible.
At banks, ratings are kept private, and the costs
and beneﬁts of rating systems are internal; hence,
pressures for accuracy, consistency, and ﬁne distinc-
tions of risk are mainly a function of the ways in
which ratings are used in managing the portfolio.
Moreover, the rating system can be tailored to ﬁt the
requirements of the bank’s primary lines of business
and can be restructured whenever the internal bene-
ﬁts of doing so exceed the costs.
Agencies and banks both consider similar risk fac-
tors, and both rely heavily on judgment and cultural
elements rather than on detailed and mechanical guid-
ance and procedures. However, the agencies publish
supplementary descriptions of rating criteria that are
much more detailed than banks’ internal guidance,
partly because agency ratings must be understood by
outsiders. In addition, the agencies track the ﬁnancial
characteristics of borrowers receiving their ratings
and publish both default histories for each grade and
ﬁnancial proﬁles of the ‘‘typical’’ borrower in each
grade, thus providing additional referents to outsiders
seeking to understand the meaning of their ratings.
Agencies have nothing comparable to a bank’s
loan review unit. The rating culture at agencies is
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cipline and a committee system. Market discipline
arises because the agencies stand between investors
and issuers, with the former typically preferring con-
servative ratings and the latter preferring optimism.
Thus, the agencies quickly hear from investors or
issuers about any perceived tendency toward exces-
sive optimism or pessimism. Although a single
agency analyst is primarily responsible for proposing
a rating, committees make the ﬁnal determinations.
The membership of a committee changes from one
rating action to the next so that agency staff mem-
bers participate in many rating decisions and a cul-
tural understanding of the meaning of each grade is
maintained.
BANKS’A TTEMPTS TO MEASURE LOSS
CHARACTERISTICS BY GRADE
Consistent and accurate rating assignments and reli-
able quantitative estimates of the risk associated with
each internal grade are useful in a bank’s efforts to
analyze risk posture, establish its appetite for risk,
and evaluate the effectiveness of its risk rating cri-
teria. At most banks, however, the primary demands
for quantitative information about PD, LIED, and EL
have come from those involved in the loan loss
reserve process and from credit modeling groups
(those building and implementing quantitative mod-
els of portfolio risk, capital allocation, proﬁtability,
and pricing). Internal ratings are key inputs into such
processes. Empirical analysis of loss characteristics
by grade appears to be an area where industry prac-
tice is developing rapidly.
Problems in Evaluating the Accuracy and
Consistency of Ratings
If internal ratings are to be accurate and consistent in
terms of the system’s loss concepts (that is, PD,
LIED, or EL), different assets posing a similar level
of risk should receive the same grade. Such quantities
are not observable ex ante, however, and thus rating
systems rely on criteria that are thought to predict
loss. Accuracy and consistency require that rating
criteria be adjusted as necessary to ensure that expo-
sures posing similar risk are grouped together (dia-
gram 2 illustrates what is involved in the adjustment
process).
As a practical matter, alignment of the ex ante
rating criteria to achieve accuracy and consistency in
the economic meaning of each rating—that is, quan-
titative loss characteristics—is a difﬁcult task. Two
problems arise: How to ensure that criteria are cali-
brated so that different assets of the same general
type in the same grade have the same loss character-
istics, and how to address diversity among asset
types. Within a narrowly deﬁned asset class, such as
loans to large commercial ﬁrms in the same industry,
comparisons across ﬁrms are relatively manageable,
so the main problem is deﬁning the boundaries of
rating categories and inferring the default or loss
rates for each category. That by itself is not easy, but
the problem becomes much more difﬁcult when very
different types of assets must be compared. For exam-
ple, how would a loan to a well-established com-
mercial real estate developer, featuring a 70 percent
loan-to-value ratio, compare with a term loan to a
ﬁrm in a relatively stable manufacturing industry
with a current debt to equity ratio of 1:1 and an
interest coverage ratio of 3?
Because the rating criteria differ so greatly for
different asset classes, some information about the
relationship of borrower and asset characteristics to
historical loss experience would appear to be nec-
essary. Especially with loss experience data covering
a fairly long period of time, say a couple of credit
cycles, it would be possible to make at least rough
inferences about relative risks across asset classes.
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, few if
any banks have available the necessary data, espe-
cially for a variety of asset classes. At a minimum,
information on the performance of individual loans
and their rating histories is required. Because rating
criteria have changed over time at most large institu-
tions, information about borrower and loan character-
istics is also required, so that the risk implications of
different rating criteria can be assessed.
Historically, banks have retained performance data
by loan type (for example, data provided on Call
Reports) or by line of business in the aggregate, but
not by risk grade. Because of mergers, even at banks
that have tracked performance by grade, data may not
cover the whole of the current institution but rather
only one predecessor institution. Mergers often cause
upheaval not only in rating processes but also in data
systems and, in particular, contribute to the loss or
obsolescence of historical data.
Although data collection is costly, many large
banks have recognized its importance and have begun
projects to build databases of loan characteristics and
loss experience. However, the costs of extracting
from archival ﬁles historical data on the performance
of individual loans appear to be prohibitively high.
Thus, those banks that are collecting data indicated
that they are several years away from having data
912 Federal Reserve Bulletin November 1998sufﬁcient to support empirical analyses of their own
portfolios that are comparable to the studies being
done for publicly issued bonds.29
In the absence of data, our impression is that the
traditional means of tuning both rating criteria and
underwriting standards relies heavily on the judg-
ment and experience of the senior credit staff with
long tenure at their institution. Over a period encom-
passing multiple credit cycles, these staff members
accumulate an individual and collective memory of
the credit problems experienced by the institution and
of the implications for risk of various borrower and
loan characteristics. Such experience is likely sufﬁ-
cient to support meaningful tuning of rating systems
that have small numbers of Pass grades (each cover-
ing a broad band of risk) and that are used to rate
traditional banking assets. The precision with which
systems involving a large number of Pass grades can
be tuned by experience alone is not clear.
Mapping to Agency Grades as a Partial
Solution
Because little information is available internally,
many banks have estimated the quantitative loss char-
acteristics of their ratings by using the extensive data
available on the loss performance of publicly issued
bonds. As noted, rating agencies and others fre-
quently publish studies covering many years of bond
default and loss experience by grade, and publicly
available databases of bond issuer characteristics
make it possible to relate loss experience to potential
29. The situation is somewhat better with respect to loss in the
event of default (LIED) in that historical studies require information
only on the bad assets. Often their number is small enough that
gathering data from paper ﬁles is feasible, and thus many banks are
beginning to accumulate LIED information from their own portfolio
experience. A few publicly available studies have also appeared.
Estimating PD and EL requires much more data in that information on
both performing and nonperforming assets are required. Studies with
LIED statistics include Lea V. Carty and Dana Lieberman, Special
Report: Defaulted Bank Loan Recoveries (Moody’s Investors Service,
1996); Elliot Asarnow and David Edwards, ‘‘Measuring Loss on
Defaulted Bank Loans: A 24-Year Study,’’ Journal of Commercial
Lending, vol. 77 (March 1995), pp. 11–23; and Society of Actuaries,
1986–92 Credit Risk Loss Experience Study: Private Placement Bonds
(Society of Actuaries, Schaumberg, Ill., 1996).
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Credit Risk Rating at Large U.S. Banks 913rating criteria. Indeed, S&P occasionally publishes
tables of indicative or average ﬁnancial ratio values
by grade (while noting that many other factors enter
into its rating decisions).
To use data on bond loss experience, a bank must
develop or assume some correspondence between
agency ratings and its own internal grades. Inter-
views suggest that the basis of such mappings is
threefold: (1) The internal grades assigned to borrow-
ers who have also issued publicly rated bonds;
(2) analysis of the ‘‘typical’’ ﬁnancial characteristics
of bank borrowers in each internal grade vis-a `-vis the
characteristics of the ﬁrms with bonds in each agency
grade; and (3) subjective analysis.
Mappings and the Problem of Different Architectures
Both banks and rating agencies assign ratings based on
criteria that are predictive of a borrower’s probability of
default (PD) or a loan’s expected loss (EL). However,
because no mechanical formula exists that converts criteria
into values of PD or EL for each grade, such values must be
obtained from historical loss experience. As noted, banks
rarely have databases of such experience, but the major
rating agencies do. A mapping of internal grades to agency
grades permits a bank to use statistics from the agencies’
bond default studies to assign values of PD to each of its
internal grades.
For simplicity, we focus here only on PD. Four problems
can cause a mapping to lead to a materially inaccurate
estimate of PD for internal grades:
(1) A bank’s rating system may place loans with widely
varying levels of PD into the same grade and similar levels
of PD into different grades. In this case, grades bear little
relation to PD values and thus mapping will not provide
good estimates of PD.
(2) Default rates on publicly issued bonds may differ
systematically from loan default rates.
(3) The mapping exercise may simply associate the
wrong agency grades with internal grades.
(4) The implications of differences between banks’
point-in-time and agencies’ through-the-cycle rating phi-
losophies may not be taken into account.
Even when the ﬁrst three problems do not apply, the
fourth, which is a characteristic of the most common map-
ping approach, can produce materially biased estimates of
PD for internal grades. Such bias can confuse attempts to
tune rating criteria and can seriously distort internal analy-
sis of business line proﬁtability, loan loss reserves, and
capital allocation.
Bias arises in the most common approach to mapping
because bank internal ratings change as the borrower’s
condition changes, whereas the PD associated with each
internal grade is stable. In contrast, agency ratings tend to
stay the same, while default probabilities for each rating
vary with the economic cycle. Thus, mapping exercises
should take into account the current point of the economic
cycle and should draw default rates from the agencies’
historical studies for similar points in prior cycles.
The fourth problem is illustrated here with an example:
Suppose that a hypothetical large bank, BigBank, has an
I. BigBank’s Pass rating scale
Grade
True PD for rating system,
but precise values not
known to bank
(percent)
1—Virtually no risk ................ 0
2—Low risk ....................... .10
3—Moderate risk .................. .25
4—Average risk ................... 1.00
5—Acceptable risk ................. 2.00
6—Borderline risk ................. 5.00
internal rating system with six Pass grades, and suppose it
has two hypothetical borrowers, OK Corp. and Less-OK
Corp. To focus on the point-in-time vs. through-the-cycle
issue, suppose we know that BigBank’s rating criteria and
rating system will always group borrowers with similar
values of PD into the same grade, that the ‘‘true’’ PD for
each grade is as shown in table I, and that BigBank does
not know the values of PD associated with its grades.
Similarly, as shown in the top section of table II, the true
PD for OK Corp. is 1 percent in upturns and 2 percent in
downturns, whereas Less-OK Corp.’s true PD is 3 percent
during upturns and 6 percent in downturns. However,
because neither BigBank nor the rating agencies know
these true PD values, they rate on the basis of observable
borrower characteristics.
Having no data on its historical loss experience, Big-
Bank maps its internal grades to agency grades simply by
identifying the agency ratings assigned to those borrowers
with such ratings in each internal grade. BigBank then uses
the corresponding long-term historical average one-year
default rate identiﬁed in agency default studies as an
estimate of the expected one-year default rate for all loans
in each internal grade.
II. Borrowers used for mapping, and their characteristics
Characteristic
Borrower
OK Corp. Less-OK Corp.
PD in upturns .................. 1percent 3 percent
PD in downturns ............... 2percent 6 percent
BigBank rating in upturns ...... 4–A verage risk 5–Acceptable risk
BigBank rating in downturns ... 5–Acceptable risk 6–Borderline risk
Agency ratings (stable through
cycle) .................... BBorBa B+orB1
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nally assigned grades of publicly rated borrowers
with ratings assigned by agencies, the danger of
circularity arises. In most cases, agency grades are
a rating criterion, and even when agency grades are
not written into rating deﬁnitions, assigners of inter-
nal ratings always know the agency grade for a given
borrower and have an idea of the borrower’s likely
position on the internal scale. Obviously, if the
agency rating is the sole criterion used in assigning
internal grades to agency-rated borrowers, rated and
unrated borrowers within a given internal grade might
Mappings and the Problem of Different Architectures—Continued
Because it rates on a point-in-time basis, BigBank does
not allow the PD values for each grade to vary through the
economic cycle; loans whose one-year PDs increase in
cyclical downturns are downgraded to a riskier internal
grade. As shown in the middle section of table II, BigBank
assigns ratings that are appropriate for varying risk: It rates
OK Corp.a4i nupturns anda5i ndownturns, and it rates
Less-OK Corp. one grade worse—a 5 in upturns anda6i n
downturns. The rating agencies are similarly accurate in
their assessment of risk (bottom section of table II), but
because they rate through the cycle (that is, according to the
borrower’s condition when under stress), they rate OK
Corp. as BB/Ba and Less-OK Corp. as B/B in both upturns
and downturns.
Suppose that BigBank conducts its mapping exercise
during an upturn. As shown in the top section of table III, it
will assume that its grade 5 is equivalent to the agencies’
B grades because Less-OK Corp. is in relatively good shape
during upturns and achieves a point-in-time internal rating
of 5 even though its through-the-cycle agency grade is B.
BigBank should infer the PD for grade 5 from the average
default frequency of B-rated public bonds only in upturns,
which is the good-year average of 4 percent (table III); but
if it follows common practice it will use the overall average
default frequency of B-rated bonds, which is 5.5 percent.
Next, suppose BigBank conducts its mapping exercise
during a downturn. As shown in the bottom section of table
III, it will assume that its grade 5 is equivalent to BB/Ba
because OK Corp. will be rated 5 (Less-OK Corp. is down-
graded to 6 during downturns). BigBank should infer the
PD for grade 5 from the bad-year average PD of BB/Ba
rated bonds (2 percent), but instead it uses the overall
average of 1 percent.











Overall Good year Bad year
Upturn ...... 4 BB/Ba 1.00 .75 2.00
5 B/B 5.50 4.00 6.50
6 ... ... ... ...
Downturn ... 4 . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 BB/Ba 1.00 .75 2.00
6 B/B 5.50 4.00 6.50
. . . Not applicable.
In this example, BigBank’s and the agencies’ rating
systems both do an excellent job of assigning ratings that
are consistent with the borrower’s true PD, but mapping
without regard to the difference between point-in-time vs.
through-the-cycle rating causes BigBank to badly mis-
estimate the PD. Using the most common mapping prac-
tices, BigBank might estimate the PD of its grade 5 at
1 percent to 5.5 percent, whereas the true PD of grade 5 is
2 percent. If the mapping is done simplistically, as in this
example, and during an upturn, BigBank likely overesti-
mates the PD, whereas during a downturn it likely underes-
timates the true value. If BigBank had used average default
frequencies from the agencies’ studies that were appro-
priate to the point in the cycle at which the mapping was
done, it might still have obtained inaccurate estimates, but
they would have been closer to the truth. BigBank might
still have been somewhat uncertain about whether to con-
sider category 5 as equivalent to BB/Ba or B, but any
such equivalence can never be exact because BigBank’s
scale and the agency scales have different conceptual
foundations.
We consider the numbers in the example to be fairly
realistic and thus the mis-mapping problem at most banks
to be potentially serious. The problem of mis-estimated
PDs is much more important at the higher-risk end of
rating scales. Precision is especially important at that end
because differences in reserve and capital allocations can
be large, whereas dollar differences in allocations across
different classes of low-risk assets are typically small. In
addition, default studies and other analyses tend to show
that variations in one-year default rates on investment-
grade assets tend to be driven by idiosyncratic factors
rather than the credit cycle.
Mapping processes are further complicated if, over time,
a borrower’s agency rating is allowed to be the dominant
criterion in assigning an internal grade. In general, such a
practice would tend to reduce the likelihood that a loan
would be appropriately downgraded during a recession—
the borrower’s agency rating would not change unless its
performance or prospects deteriorated more than antici-
pated in the agency’s through-the-cycle risk analysis. This
procedure could effectively turn BigBank’s ratings into
through-the-cycle rather than point-in-time, putting loss
estimates potentially out of line with management analyses
that assume point-in-time grading.
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mapping is circular because borrowers are assigned
to internal grades based on the agency rating, and the
agency rating corresponding to each internal grade
is inferred only from such rating assignments. The
banks we interviewed maintain that agency ratings
are used only as a starting point in their rating pro-
cesses, not as the sole criterion.30
Mapping and the Problems Caused by
Inconsistent Architectures
Because major agencies rate borrowers with the
expectation that the rating will be stable through
normal economic and industry cycles, only those
borrowers that perform much worse than expected
during a cyclical downturn will be downgraded (will
‘‘migrate’’ to riskier grades). In contrast, rating sys-
tems that focus on the borrower’s current condition
(virtually all bank systems) are likely to feature much
more migration as cycles progress but, in principle,
should exhibit somewhat less cyclical variation in
default rates for each individual grade.
Though apparently subtle, this difference in archi-
tectures has important implications for mapping exer-
cises and the inference of PD values for internal
grades. Both the point in the economic cycle at which
the mapping exercise is done and the exact nature of
the PD statistics drawn from the agencies’ studies of
long-term default history can have a dramatic effect
on the mapping (see box ‘‘Mappings and the Problem
of Different Architectures’’). Values of PD attributed
to internal grades can differ by several percentage
points depending on how the mapping is done. PDs
are most likely to be badly estimated for the higher-
risk Pass grades, but precision is also especially
important for such grades in that allocated reserves
and capital are most sensitive to assumptions about
riskier assets.
Obtaining reasonably accurate mappings is mainly
a matter of paying attention to the stage of the cycle
at which the mapping is being done and of using
historical average PD values from either good-
experience or bad-experience years as appropriate.
However, interviews left us with the impression that
few banks carefully consider cyclical issues when
mapping their internal grades to agency grades.
AN AGGREGATE BANK RISK PROFILE
Mapping between internal and agency grades facili-
tates a bank’s quantitative loss analysis and the inte-
gration of publicly available information into rating
decisions. Such mappings also make possible an esti-
mate of the risk proﬁle of the internally rated portion
of bank loan portfolios on a standardized scale. Infor-
mation about the risk proﬁle of bank credit helps put
many rating system issues in perspective.
As part of the analysis leading to this article, we
reviewed internal reports showing distributions of
rated assets across internal grades for the ﬁfty largest
consolidated domestic bank holding companies. In
addition, we obtained mappings of internal grades to
agency equivalents from twenty-six of them. The
mappings allow us to allocate internally rated bal-
ances to grades on a rating agency scale. To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time that such a character-
ization of the overall risk proﬁle of a large portion of
the banking industry’s commercial loan portfolio has
been possible.
The twenty-six banks accounted for more than
75 percent of aggregate banking industry assets at
year-end 1997. Rated loans outstanding at individual
large banks usually represent 50 percent to 60 percent
of their total loans.31
In general, we cannot judge whether the mappings
provided by banks are correct. Inaccuracy can arise
from errors or inconsistency in assigning the internal
ratings themselves, problems of cyclicality or cir-
cularity in the mapping process, inconsistencies
between large corporate and middle market lines of
business, or other difﬁculties. In addition, mappings
at some institutions are more precise in form than at
other institutions in that they distinguish among
modiﬁed agency grades, such as BB and BB+. Still,
such mappings are an element of banks’ day-to-day
operating procedures and analysis, which suggests
that the twenty-six banks have endeavored to make
them as accurate as possible within the constraints of
their rating systems. It thus appears that aggregation
and comparison of these mapped balances represents
a reasonable—albeit crude and broad—ﬁrst approxi-
mation of the actual risks in banks’ portfolios.
Chart 3 displays the aggregate weighted-average
distribution of internally rated outstanding loans at
year-end 1997 for the twenty-six consolidated bank
holding companies. About half of aggregate rated
loans pose below-investment-grade risks (were rated
the equivalent of BB+/Ba1 or riskier), and about
65 percent of outstandings were concentrated around 30. Even when circularity is avoided, heavy use of bond experi-
ence data in deﬁning criteria for each grade might lead to exclusion of
criteria needed to capture the risk of unrated borrowers, such as
middle-market ﬁrms. 31. Total loans includes consumer loans, which are rarely rated.
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investment grades (rated BBB or BB).
Banks’ loan loss experience during 1997 is consis-
tent with the credit quality distribution shown in
chart 3. Using the 1997 default frequencies for each
grade drawn from S&P’s latest annual study and an
assumption that the average LIED for loans is about
30 percent, an aggregate portfolio with the quality
distribution for the twenty-six banks would be
expected to have an annual credit loss rate of roughly
0.20 percent. Although this rate is roughly equal to
the actual loan loss experience of the banking indus-
try’s aggregate commercial loan portfolio during
1997 (0.21 percent), this simple exercise should
not be taken as proof that the distribution in chart 3
is representative; nonetheless, the results are
supportive.32
Chart 4 displays the percentages of internally rated
assets that are below investment grade as of year-
end 1997 for twenty-six banks in three peer group-
ings: major loan syndication agents; smaller banks
(less than $25 billion in total assets at year-end
1997); and the remainder of the twenty-six, labeled
‘‘regionals’’ (many other peer groupings are possible,
of course). The three peer groups display systematic
differences in risk posture. On average, the major
agents have 45 percent of rated assets in categories
corresponding to BB and riskier, compared with
about 60 percent for regionals and 75 percent for
smaller banks.33
USES OF INTERNAL RISK GRADES
Banks use internal ratings in two broad categories of
activity: analysis and reporting, and administration.
Analytic uses include reporting of risk postures to
senior management and the board of directors; loan
loss reserving; and economic capital allocation, prof-
itability measurement, product pricing, and (indi-
rectly) employee compensation. Administrative uses
include loan monitoring, regulatory compliance, and
credit culture maintenance. In addition, external enti-
ties such as investors or regulators may become more
signiﬁcant users of internal ratings information. Dif-
ferent uses place different stresses on the rating sys-
tem and may have different implications for the inter-
nal controls needed to maintain the system’s integrity
(diagram 1 shows such uses).
Portfolio Reporting
Virtually all large banks report total asset balances
in each of the regulatory problem-asset grades to
32. Actual loss experience is measured as the average annualized
net charge-off rate for bank loans in the commercial and industrial,
commercial mortgage, and agricultural loan categories as reported
on the quarterly Report of Condition—or Call Report—ﬁled by all
banks.
33. That the fraction of loans posing below-investment-grade risks
is much larger at some institutions than at others does not imply a
priori that such institutions are operating in an unsafe or unsound
fashion. In general, provided a bank is aware of its risk posture, has
adequate processes to manage risk, is pricing loans to reﬂect the risk,
and has reserves and capital that are adequate to the risks, a portfolio
with a large fraction of below-investment-grade exposures can be
safe, sound, and proﬁtable.
3. Percentage of aggregate internally rated outstandings
placed in each agency rating category at banks







AAA/aaa AA/aa A BBB/Baa BB/Ba B Cs D
Note. The banks are twenty-six of the ﬁfty largest.
4. Percentage of aggregate internally rated outstandings
below investment grade at banks mapping to agency
scale, by bank group, year-end 1997





Note. The banks are twenty-six of the ﬁfty largest.
1. Less than $25 billion in total assets. Regionals are those that are not major
syndication agents or smaller banks.
Credit Risk Rating at Large U.S. Banks 917senior management and the board of directors. About
80 percent also internally report balances in each of
their Pass grades. In the latter case, such reports
appear to be used either by management or the credit
staff as a means of detecting changes in portfolio mix
and are only infrequently shown to boards of direc-
tors.34 Balances in the regulatory grades give a sense
of the share of bank assets that are troubled, whereas
a proﬁle of balances in Pass grades can provide a
forward-looking sense of trends in the bank’s risk
posture so long as Pass grade assignments meaning-
fully distinguish risks; internal reports are much less
informative when a large share of rated assets falls
into only one or two Pass grades.
Reserving
Although many accounting and regulatory policies
inﬂuence the setting of loan loss reserves and provi-
sions, balances in the regulatory grades are integral
to reserve analysis at all banks. Supervisors require
a speciﬁc reserve of at least 50 percent of Doubtful
loans plus 20 percent of Substandard loans; banks set
the amount of additional reserves for OAEM and
Pass loans according to their judgment, subject to
evaluation by examiners.35 Many banks develop re-
serve factors speciﬁc to each Pass category. Accord-
ing to accounting and regulatory standards, loan loss
reserves are to cover losses already ‘‘embedded in the
portfolio,’’ and the generally accepted interpretation
is that reserves for Pass loans should cover expected
losses over a period of one year. Thus, if an institu-
tion can identify a reasonable estimate of expected
loss for each Pass grade, a reserve analysis sensitive
to balances in the different Pass grades provides a
good estimate of embedded losses.
A signiﬁcant number of the banks we interviewed
do not differentiate among the Pass grades in per-
forming reserve analysis. In such cases, a single
expected-loss (EL) weight is applied to balances in
all Pass grades. Such a simpliﬁcation is least costly in
terms of accuracy of the reserve analysis when loan
balances are concentrated in a single category or
when the composition of the Pass portfolio by risk
grade is very stable.
Proﬁtability Analysis, Pricing Guidelines,
and Compensation
All banks we interviewed conduct internal proﬁtabil-
ity analyses (of different business lines, for example).
Some banks do not use internal ratings at all in such
analyses, whereas others include a rating-sensitive
expected-loss cost but no rating-sensitive capital cost.
The most sophisticated analyses involve both
expected-loss costs and costs of allocated capital that
vary by internal rating. The higher such costs, the
lower the measured proﬁtability of a business unit or
individual transaction. The use of rating-sensitive
proﬁtability analysis thus has signiﬁcant implica-
tions for the design and operation of internal rating
systems.
To implement rating-sensitive proﬁtability analy-
sis, the bank must estimate expected losses for assets
in each grade as well as the amount of economic
capital to allocate (if it allocates capital). Economic
capital for the bank as a whole is that needed to
maintain the bank’s solvency in the face of unexpect-
edly large losses. The process of estimating the addi-
tional economic capital needed as a result of booking
any given loan is complex, but as a practical matter,
the loan’s internal rating is a primary (if not the sole)
day-to-day determinant of the capital allocations
imposed by risk-sensitive proﬁtability models.36
The measured proﬁtability of business units is
an important factor in management decisions about
which units should grow or shrink. When risk-
sensitive proﬁtability is appraised at the level of the
individual loan or relationship, unproﬁtable loans are
not made and unproﬁtable relationships are even-
tually dropped. At a growing number of banks,
employee compensation is formally tied to proﬁtabil-
ity measured by such systems.
34. At some banks, portfolio composition is reported as a weighted-
average risk grade. Such averages weight the balances by the grade’s
numeric designator. For example, assets in grade 4 are treated as being
twice as risky as assets in grade 2. This can produce misleading
averages because risk—whether PD or EL—tends to increase more
than linearly with grade (table 2). At those banks we interviewed that
used this measure, the staff seemed to understand that it does not
reﬂect portfolio risk—it can indicate only whether the mix has
changed.
35. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Inter-
agency Policy Statement on the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses
(December 1993).
36. Mechanically, one can think of economic capital for the credit
risk of a whole portfolio as that amount necessary to cover (for
example) 99.9 percent of the possible portfolio loss rates. Capital
required to support a given loan can be viewed as that increment to
total bank capital that will keep the bank insolvency probability
constant if the given loan is added to the portfolio. Conceptually, total
capital can be split into expected and unexpected loss portions. In an
accounting sense, the loan loss reserve might be viewed as covering
the expected loss and equity as covering the unexpected loss. For
more details, see ‘‘Credit Risk Models and Major U.S. Banking
Institutions: Current State of the Art and Implications for Assessments
of Capital Adequacy,’’ Federal Reserve System Task Force on Internal
Credit Risk Models (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, May 1998).
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of risk-sensitive proﬁtability analysis puts signiﬁ-
cant new pressures on the risk grading system. Pres-
sure to rate loans favorably arises because expected
losses and capital allocations are lower for lower-
risk loans. Some institutions found that many loans
were upgraded shortly after the introduction of
proﬁtability analysis, although the overall degree
of the shift was small. One institution speciﬁcally
mentioned an upward bias of about one-half
grade relative to previous rating practice. Many
noted that the number of disagreements in which
relationship managers pressed for more favorable
ratings increased once such systems were put into
place.
In addition to pressure for more favorable ratings,
rating-sensitive proﬁtability analysis also creates
pressure to increase the number of rating categories.
This pressure, which comes both from the business
line staff and the proﬁtability analysis unit itself,
arises because some of the loans in any given grade
are less risky than other loans in that grade and thus
should bear smaller credit costs. Creation of more
grades allows for better recognition of such risk
differences. Institutions reported that the pressure to
increase the number of grades has become more
pronounced in recent years as competitive forces
have compressed loan spreads; in this setting, reduc-
ing expected loss factors by a few basis points, or
slightly reducing the amount of capital allocated to
the loan, may be the difference between a transaction
that meets internal proﬁtability ‘‘hurdles’’ and one
that does not.
These stresses place increased pressure on the loan
review unit to maintain discipline and enforce con-
sistency, stability, and accuracy. Controlling rating
biases is always a challenge. As the number of grades
on the scale increases and the distinctions of risk
become ﬁner, disagreements about ratings naturally
arise more frequently, and the control of biases
becomes even more difﬁcult. The difﬁculty seems
likely to be greatest just after the number of grades is
increased because the loan review staff must enforce
(and if necessary, develop) new cultural deﬁnitions
for the grades. The latter task is somewhat easier at
banks that use external referents in assigning or
reviewing ratings, such as default probability models
and agency ratings of borrowers; such referents give
loan reviewers objective benchmarks to use in identi-
fying problems and communicating with staff. Rede-
signs of the rating scale that split existing grades
into smaller compartments are also easier to imple-
ment because the existing cultural deﬁnitions can be
reﬁned rather than replaced.
Risk-sensitive proﬁtability analysis also increases
the demand for internal data on loss experience and
for mappings to external referents because the analy-
sis demands relatively precise quantiﬁcation of the
risk characteristics of each grade. However, such
analysis can also make existing data and mappings
less useful, at least in the short run, because rating
pressures or changes in architecture may, to some
extent, change the effective meaning of grades.
Using Ratings to Trigger Administrative
Actions
As noted, many banks include an internal watch
grade on their scales in addition to the regulatory
problem-asset grades (formally, the watch grade
would be counted among the Pass grades). Reassign-
ment of a loan to watch or regulatory grades typically
triggers a process of quarterly (or even monthly)
reporting and formal reviews of the loan. At institu-
tions where the main use of ratings is for monitoring
and regulatory reporting, RMs’ incentives are often
the opposite of those introduced by rating-sensitive
proﬁtability analysis: Their main interest is to avoid
getting caught assigning ratings that are not risky
enough. Getting caught can have negative career
implications, and thus RMs have an incentive to
assign credits to the riskiest Pass grade that is not
watch. For example, some banks are especially likely
to penalize RMs when a loan review reassigns a Pass
credit from one of the less risky grades into a regula-
tory grade. Penalties can be forthcoming even when a
loan is reassigned from a less risky Pass grade into
watch, but are likely to be less severe. Thus, in the
absence of carefully designed controls, the presence
of administrative grades in a rating system can reduce
the accuracy of non-administrative Pass grade assign-
ments. This sort of bias is less likely at the largest
banks because the countervailing incentives of rating-
sensitive proﬁtability analysis are most likely to oper-
ate there.
However, incentives associated with rating-
sensitive proﬁtability analysis can reduce the effec-
tiveness of administrative management of problem
loans. The staff may delay assigning credits to watch
or regulatory grades because of the negative implica-
tions for measured proﬁtability. Thus, there is a cer-
tain tension in the simultaneous use of rating systems
for administrative purposes and for proﬁtability
analysis. Such tension can be overcome with proper
oversight, the implementation of which represents
another burden on loan review functions.
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Entities
Internal ratings are a potential source of information
for bank investors and regulators. For example, dis-
closure of the proﬁle of a bank’s loans across its
internal rating categories might enhance the ability of
shareholders and analysts to assess bank risk.
Moreover, investors in securitizations of traditional
commercial loans might beneﬁt from information
about the credit quality of the underlying assets.
Some banks are reportedly considering using internal
rating information in structuring such securitizations.
For example, when loans in the securitized pool
are paid off, the new loans replacing them may be
required to be drawn from a particular internal grade.
Obviously, to evaluate the attractiveness of the pool,
investors (or rating agencies) must be able to under-
stand the loss characteristics of each internal grade
and must have conﬁdence that such characteristics
will remain stable over time. Thus, external valida-
tion of rating systems becomes necessary if internal
ratings are to be used in securitizations. Such valida-
tion would appear to be quite difﬁcult because each
bank’s rating scale is different, and the meaning of
ratings is largely embedded in culture rather than in
writing. Moreover, most banks do not have sufﬁcient
historical data on loss experience by internal grade to
support objective measurements.
Internal ratings might also be used in bank super-
vision and regulation. As a banking supervisor, the
Federal Reserve has long emphasized the impor-
tance of strong risk management practices at banks
and has stated its desire to orient its activities more
toward testing of risk management and control pro-
cesses and somewhat away from testing of individual
transactions. This preference allows for less intru-
sion into the operation of the bank and minimizes
the restrictive effect of supervision on banking
innovation.
Information on a bank’s risk proﬁle by internal
grade and shifts in that proﬁle over time could
become a useful supervisory tool. Supervisors could
use internal proﬁle information as one consideration
in evaluating the asset quality and credit risk manage-
ment of large banks, probably on balance reducing
the overall burden of supervision. For those institu-
tions that map their internal ratings to external refer-
ence points, such as the S&P scale, supervisors could
use the mapping to put large institutions roughly on a
common scale (in a fashion similar to that shown in
chart 3). While bearing in mind that this technique is
very crude, analysis of risk proﬁles and of trends in
proﬁles could provide valuable insights into credit
conditions and standards in the industry as well as at
individual institutions. Continuing work by indi-
vidual institutions to better understand the loss char-
acteristics of loans in their own risk grades will be
important to reﬁning and interpreting such compari-
sons over time.
Internal risk grades could also become an explicit
element in the evaluation of capital adequacy. The
current risk-based capital regime (based on the 1988
Basle Accord) provides for lower capital weights on
certain low-risk assets (for example, those that are
government-issued or guaranteed) but applies the
same capital requirement (that is, 8 percent) to essen-
tially all loans to private borrowers regardless of the
underlying risk. Internal risk grades might become
one consideration in scaling capital requirements on
business loans more closely to the loss characteristics
of a bank’s loan portfolio.
Greater supervisory reliance on internal credit risk
ratings would require that supervisors be conﬁdent of
the rigor and integrity of internal rating systems.
Heretofore, examiners have sought to validate assign-
ments to internal grades only as they relate to the
regulatory problem-asset grades. If supervisors are to
rely more heavily on Pass grade information, some
degree of validation and testing would have to be
extended to those grades as well.
External use of internal ratings would introduce
new stresses on internal rating systems. In some
respects, the stresses would parallel those associated
with rating-sensitive proﬁtability analysis. That is,
incentives would arise to grade optimistically and to
alter the rating system to produce more ﬁne-grained
distinctions of risk. However, new incentive conﬂicts
would arise between outsiders on the one side and the
bank as a whole on the other. Such new conﬂicts
could overwhelm the checks and balances currently
provided by internal review functions. Even in the
absence of such incentive conﬂicts, external users
might demand a greater degree of accuracy or consis-
tency in rating assignments than that required inter-
nally. For both reasons, external reviews and vali-
dation of the rating system might be necessary. In
addition, banks and external parties should both be
aware that the additional stress imposed by external
uses, if not properly controlled, could impair the
effectiveness of internal rating systems as a tool for
managing the bank’s credit risk.37
37. In the early 1990s, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) introduced a system of risk-based capital
requirements for insurance companies in which requirements vary
with the ratings of assets. Although such ratings are assigned by the
NAIC’s Securities Valuation Ofﬁce (SVO), the SVO does take into
account any ratings of assets published by major rating agencies. In
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A bank’s decisions about its internal rating system
can have a material effect on its ability to manage
credit risk. But development of internal rating system
architectures and operating designs that are appropri-
ate to the uses made of the ratings is an especially
complex task. The central role of human judgment in
the rating process and the variety of possible uses for
ratings mean that internal incentives can inﬂuence
rating decisions. Thus, careful design of controls and
internal review procedures is a crucial consideration
in aligning form with function.
No single internal rating system is best for all
banks. Banks’ systems vary widely largely because
of differences in business mix and in the uses to
which ratings are put. Among variations in business
mix, the share of large-corporate loans in a bank’s
portfolio has the largest implications for its internal
rating system. Banks with a substantial large cor-
porate market presence are likely to beneﬁt from a
rating system that achieves ﬁne distinctions among
relatively low-risk credits, while other banks may
ﬁnd signiﬁcantly less value in such distinctions. In
addition, an independent credit staff is often solely
responsible for rating large loans. Such an arrange-
ment can greatly reduce potential incentive conﬂicts,
but may involve per-loan costs that are too large to be
economic for smaller loans, which are often rated by
relationship managers. Smaller loans also pose less
risk to bank earnings and capital, and thus grading
errors and biases may be more tolerable.
Among the various uses of internal ratings, proﬁt-
ability analysis and product pricing models have the
most signiﬁcant implications for the rating system.
At banks where such analysis is in place, ratings can
have a material effect on the measured proﬁtability of
transactions and relationships and can directly or
indirectly inﬂuence the compensation of bank staff.
Thus, careful attention to review and control pro-
cedures that limit biases in ratings is important to
the accuracy and consistency of internal ratings.
Proﬁtability analysis also introduces pressures for
rating systems with more risk grades. Relationship
managers may press for such systems because of a
desire to subdivide grades that cover broad ranges
of risk, thereby allowing different expected loss and
capital charges for exposures at different ends of the
ranges. The groups that develop and maintain the
proﬁtability analysis systems may also press for ﬁne-
grained distinctions in order to support better balanc-
ing of risk and return. However, internal rating sys-
tems with many grades may make review and control
of grading both more difﬁcult and more expensive
because reasonable people are more likely to differ in
their subjective judgments when differences between
grades are small rather than large.
Our interviews indicate that certain practices can
improve the quality of any internal rating system and
are especially helpful to rating systems that support
analytical functions such as proﬁtability analysis and
portfolio management. First, a bank with appropriate
data describing its historical loss experience by inter-
nal grade and by different risk factors is better able to
assess the predictive power of its ratings criteria and
to estimate values of parameters needed for its analy-
ses (such as grade-speciﬁc values of PD or EL).
Second, assigning or reviewing ratings with the aid
of agency ratings, statistical models of default prob-
ability, or other objective criteria helps limit the
magnitude of rating biases. However, care must be
used in mapping internal grades to external grades or
other indicators to ensure that the desired results are
achieved. Finally, internal ratings grounded in clear
loss concepts are helpful in grade assignment and
review because rating criteria can be clearly linked to
different aspects of risk. For example, a system that
has separate grades for default probability and loss in
event of default can incorporate different effects for a
wide variety of types of collateral. All three of these
practices are likely to be helpful in reﬁning the sub-
jective judgments that are central to almost all rating
systems.
By their nature, banks’ credit cultures typically
adapt slowly to changes in conditions. The rapid pace
of change in risk management practice and the
trend toward risk-sensitive proﬁtability analysis has
recently increased the stresses on credit cultures
in general and internal rating systems in particular.
Careful attention to the many considerations noted in
this article can help accelerate the process of adjust-
ment and thus the easing of stresses.
The use of internal ratings by external entities such
as regulators and investors has the potential to intro-
duce new stresses in which incentives conﬂicts that
pit banks’ interests against those of the external enti-
ties compound existing internal tensions. Use of
internal ratings by entities outside the bank would
probably require some external validation of the
ratings and the systems that generate them. In our
view, such validation is probably feasible, but careful
development of a new body of practice will be
required.
the wake of this and other developments in the insurance industry, the
rating agencies experienced substantial pressure from both issuers and
investors (insurance companies) to assign favorable ratings to some
assets, a new and difﬁcult development for the agencies in that issuers
and investors had traditionally applied opposing pressures.
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